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Richard Wright‘s powerful 1940 novel Native Son holds a notoriously vexed 
place in literary history. Wright has been variously disparaged for his depiction of 
women, pilloried for his ―gratuitous‖ violence, denigrated for his embrace of 
programmatic naturalism and dismissed as the author of overdetermined naturalist fiction 
and tediously didactic protest literature. Nonetheless, his work remains widely read, and 
Native Son is still considered an indispensible classic in the tradition of American letters. 
In his recent book-length investigation of Wright, Mikko Tuhkanen suggests that it is 
precisely his enduring legacy that limits contemporary critical considerations of Wright. 
Tuhkanen argues that such overexposure ―has made it difficult to approach his texts—
especially the most influential ones—without already knowing what one will read, 
without already being sutured into a fixed perspective as a reader‖ (xxv). Barbara 
Johnson makes a similar argument about the effect of canonization on reading practices 
in The Wake of Deconstruction (1994), arguing that critical discourse establishes a 
―screen of received ideas‖ (Paul de Man‘s phrase) between canonized texts and their 
readers. Citing Paul de Man‘s essay ―The Return to Philology‖ (1982), Johnson explains, 
―While critics of the university are claiming that campus radicals are subverting the 
literary canon and that students are no longer reading it, de Man is here claiming that 
really reading the canon is what is subversive, because students in traditional ‗humanist‘ 
classrooms are usually taught not to read it, but to learn ideas about it‖ (30). Drawing on 
Johnson‘s and de Man‘s arguments, Tuhkanen asserts that because ―our canonical 
readings of them may in fact be but inherited preconceptions,‖ what is needed are careful 
re-readings of Wright‘s most canonical works, particularly Native Son and Black Boy, 
that self-consciously defamiliarize underlying assumptions about them (xxv).  
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 Tuhkanen‘s insights provide a useful preface to my own experience reading 
Native Son. I was introduced to Wright‘s novel during the Spring of my first year of 
graduate school. In fact, I was assigned to read Native Son twice that semester by two 
different professors. In one of these courses I had just read Wright‘s harrowing 
autobiography Black Boy (1945), and would eventually read one of his nonfiction works, 
Black Power (1954). That semester I would also go on to read Ralph Ellison‘s collection 
of essays Shadow and Act and James Baldwin‘s collection of essays The Price of the 
Ticket, which contain the infamous critiques of Wright that each respectively forwarded 
in the 1940s and 1950s. So I would go that Spring, in a very short amount of time, from 
having read absolutely nothing by Wright to having read a good deal of writing both by 
and about him, and having spent a decent amount of time thinking about Wright and his 
critics, and discussing them with my colleagues and professors. But the truth is that when 
I sat down that Spring to read Native Son, I was relatively new to literary studies, having 
majored in political science as an undergraduate, and, therefore, I knew virtually nothing 
about Wright, nor of his reception and reputation. However, taking a cue from Tuhkanen, 
I‘d like to reframe my embarrassing ignorance of such an important man in American 
letters by suggesting that I came to Native Son with a relatively untrammeled opinion of 
the novel (or its author) beyond the fact that I had been assigned to read a large portion of 
his oeuvre in my first year of graduate school. Contrary to Tuhkanen‘s concern that the 
novel‘s canonization had rendered it already-read, I approached Native Son more or less 
on its own terms because I knew absolutely nothing about it.
1
   
                                                          
1
 Tuhkanen uses the term “already-read” to describe the effect of canonization on Wright’s most widely 
read works. He draws the term from Paul de Man who suggested that the canon need not be dismantled, 
but (re)read.  
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 As the semester progressed and my knowledge of Wright grew, I found myself 
increasingly unsatisfied with interpretations of the novel offered by my peers, literary 
scholars and Wright‘s contemporaries alike. A pattern emerged in responses to Native 
Son, in which certain words and phrases were repeatedly called upon to raise objections 
to Wright‘s novel. Indeed, the parity between responses in both of my graduate seminars 
was almost uncanny, as students not only voiced similar criticisms in the two separate 
classes, but actually used the exact same terms in doing so. For example, in discussing 
the protagonist Bigger Thomas, one of the very first questions raised by both classes was 
whether or not Bigger is a ―human.‖ My colleagues pointed to Bigger‘s propensity for 
violence and his apparent lack of consciousness as evidence that he belonged outside the 
province of humanity.  To be honest, when the question was raised in the first class, I was 
a little taken aback, as I was unsure of exactly what the alternatives were. If Bigger 
Thomas was not a ―human,‖ then what else could he be? Several words were thrown 
around during these discussions that relegated Bigger to the fringes of personhood: 
subhuman, monster, beast, brute, mindless, subconscious, bestial; one of my colleagues 
pointed out that several people had even slipped into referring to Bigger as ―it.‖  The 
conclusion that was ultimately reached in both of my classes was that, in fact, Bigger is 
not a human, but rather a symbol. In other words, in order for Bigger‘s brutality and 
seeming lack of consciousness to make sense, we had to read him as something other 
than a human being. What fascinated me about my classmates‘ discussions was not 
simply that they were thinking about Bigger as a symbol. It is, of course, quite common 
to think of characters in literature as symbolic of something other than themselves, or 
representing something beyond the pages of the book. Rather, what struck me was that 
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Bigger‘s symbolicity was being suggested in the place of, or at the cost of, his status as 
an individual human being.  
 The tendency to discuss Bigger as something other than a human is part of a long 
critical tradition that dates back to the novel‘s publication. In the decades after Native Son 
appeared, a series of infamous responses to the novel came from the pens of Wright‘s 
very own friends and protégés, Ralph Ellison and James Baldwin, both of whom were 
somewhat artistically and professionally indebted to Wright. Despite the fact that Wright 
had helped them jumpstart their literary careers, Ellison and Baldwin both publicly 
criticized him, and especially Native Son, in a series of essays and speeches in the 1940s 
and 1950s. Their comments ultimately stimulated a vehement public debate between 
Ellison and fellow critic Irving Howe in the literary journals of the 1960s, when, a few 
years after Wright‘s death, Howe published an essay defending him against Baldwin and 
Ellison‘s criticisms.  
 For example, in his acceptance speech for the 1953 National Book Award, ―Brave 
Words for a Startling Occasion,‖ Ellison had publicly criticized the ―hard boiled‖ realism 
and ―narrow naturalism‖ of Wright‘s literary aesthetic.2 Baldwin similarly criticized 
Wright in his now notorious 1945 essay ―Everybody‘s Protest Novel,‖ arguing that the 
tradition of American protest literature, from Uncle Tom’s Cabin to Native Son, reduces 
the complexity of black life in the name of political expediency. He asserted that the 
danger in these representations is that they ultimately traffic in the very racism that they 
aim to combat. He points to Native Son as a perfect example of this hazard, claiming that 
                                                          
2
 Ellison had also previously criticized Wright in a 1940 review of Native Son (that he later denied having 
ever written), as well as in his review of Black Boy, which he opens with the somewhat backhanded 
reference to Native Son: “Imagine Bigger Thomas projecting his own life in lucid prose, guided say, by the 
insights of Marx and Freud, and you have an idea of this autobiography” (77).  
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by representing Bigger as ―subhuman,‖ Wright‘s novel merely perpetuates the 
―monstrous legend it was written to destroy‖ (33).   
 Baldwin later elaborated his critique of Wright in a lengthier essay, ―Many 
Thousands Gone,‖ (1951) in which he condemns the field of sociology and protest novels 
as mutually implicated in reducing black people to a series of dehumanized stereotypes. 
He argued that sociology positions the black man as ―a social and not a personal or 
human problem…somehow analogous to disease…which must be checked…‖ (66). He 
explained that sociology, with its endless ―statistics‖ and ―cataloguing,‖ constructs a 
generic ―image‖ of the black man that strips him of his individual personality (66). 
Protest novels like Native Son, he charged, merely perpetuate these constructions with 
their one-dimensional caricatures of black character. Although he concedes that Bigger 
successfully represents ―that fantasy Americans hold in their minds when they speak of 
the Negro: that fantastic and fearful image which we have lived with since the first slave 
fell beneath the lash,‖ he faulted Wright for pursuing a ―sociological vision‖ of black life 
in Native Son and for representing Bigger as a social cipher rather than a fully realized 
person (71). Describing Bigger as a ―symbolical monster,‖ he argues that a more 
complicated representation of his psyche, ―would have given him a stature more nearly 
human and an end more nearly tragic‖ (75). But he laments that, ultimately, Wright‘s 
novel finds itself ―so trapped by the American image of Negro life…that it cannot pursue 
its own implications‖ (75). 
 When Howe defended Wright against these criticisms in an essay published in the 
Autumn 1963 issue of Dissent magazine, he set off an emphatic debate with Ellison, who 
responded to Howe‘s accusations in kind. Provocatively titling his essay ―Black Boys and 
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Native Sons,‖ (1963) Howe chastised Baldwin and Ellison for turning against their 
literary progenitor, dismissing their criticisms as ―attacks launched by young writers 
against their famous elders‖ (39). He praises the novel for the authenticity of its 
representation and for Wright‘s unapologetic commitment to tell ―the truth about 
American Negroes‖ (45). Responding directly to Ellison‘s and Baldwin‘s objections to 
Bigger‘s characterization, he declares that although Bigger is, ―more a brute energy than 
a particularized figure…[his] cowering perception of the world becomes the most vivid 
and authentic component of the book‖ (43). He also defends Wright‘s embrace of 
naturalism, arguing that although the novel has its origins in ―white fantasy and white 
contempt‖ it nonetheless records ―an authentic projection of a social reality‖ (42, 44). 
 Ellison‘s impassioned response, ―The World and the Jug,‖ appeared in the 
December 1963 issue of New Leader. He begins his fiery essay with a penetrating set of 
questions about the racist assumptions underlying so many critics‘ approach to literature 
written by black Americans and excoriates Howe‘s reading of Native Son as evidence of 
his limited understanding of the black American experience (112).  Ellison maintains that 
Wright‘s depiction of Bigger is far too deterministic and lacking in nuance to approach 
anything like an authentic representation. He condemns Bigger‘s lack of psychological 
complexity, arguing that he is ―near-subhuman‖ and conceives of the world ―solely in 
terms of the physical, the non-conscious‖ (114).  Ellison and Howe would go on to 
respond to each other again in a set of essays published in New Leader in February of 
1964, at which point their arguments more or less turn away from Wright‘s novel in 
particular, and focus instead on the role of the black artist and artistic autonomy in 
general. 
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 While Howe and Ellison‘s debate (and by extension, Baldwin‘s essays) reveals 
two disparate conclusions about the merits of Wright‘s novel, their arguments 
nonetheless share common assumptions that are fundamental to their arguments. Though 
they disagree on Bigger‘s authenticity, both position him on the peripheries of 
personhood (he is ―subhuman‖ and ―non-conscious‖ in Ellison‘s words, ―brute‖ and a 
―trifle conscious‖ in Howe‘s, and for Baldwin, a ―monster,‖ lacking a fully developed 
consciousness). As my classmates had done, they read Bigger as a symbol in order to 
explain his characterization – in other words, they interpret Bigger‘s subhumanity 
metaphorically. For example, rather than person (a ―particularized figure‖), Howe says 
that Bigger represents a ―terrifying symptom‖ of the ―disease of our culture‖ (44). Ellison 
had warned in ―The World and the Jug,‖ that advancing such an interpretation was 
dangerous, accusing Howe that his defense of the novel suggested that ―when he [Howe] 
looks at a Negro he sees not a human being but an abstract embodiment of living hell‖ 
(112). But Ellison‘s and Baldwin‘s readings of the novel bear no small resemblance to 
Howe‘s, as all three interpret Bigger as a subhuman symbol: Ellison deems Bigger a 
―subhuman indictment of white oppression,‖ (114) and Baldwin describes him as a 
―symbolical monster…created by the American republic‖ (72).  
 While Howe accepts Bigger‘s subhuman stature on the grounds that he 
symbolizes a larger ―sociological truth,‖ it is precisely Bigger‘s symbolism that 
invalidates his authenticity (or truth-value) for Baldwin and Ellison. But what is at stake 
here is Bigger‘s position on the spectrum of representation, not his humanity, as all three 
authors tacitly agree he is subhuman. Baldwin‘s and Ellison‘s criticisms likely stem from 
racism‘s entrenchment in the politics of black images, which meant that representations 
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of black character often carried the weight of material consequences. As Baldwin had 
noted in ―Many Thousands Gone,‖ this dynamic essentially denied black people (and 
black artists in particular), the luxury of being individuals, because they had, ―the 
necessity thrust on [them]…of being the representative of some thirteen million people‖ 
(71).  As black artists, Baldwin and Ellison were profoundly aware of this burden of 
representation, and therefore registered understandable anxiety with thinking about 
Bigger as a symbolic or representative figure. Indeed, one of the central concerns in their 
respective essays is the violence inherent in compressing the black life into symbolic 
abstractions. Such limited representations were necessarily dehumanizing, they argued, 
because they failed to account for each person‘s complex individuality that subtends such 
abstractions. This was the crux of the issue for Baldwin as an artist, who variously 
describes the human condition, and the situation of black Americans in particular, in his 
essays  as ―contradiction,‖ ―disquiet complexity,‖ ―savage paradox‖ ―a web of 
ambiguity,‖ and an ―inward contention of love and hatred, blackness and whiteness‖ that 
is ―resolutely indefinable, unpredictable‖ (29, 75-76). According to Ellison and Baldwin, 
it was Wright‘s aesthetic commitment to a sociological vision that hindered him from 
communicating a deeper truth about the complexity of black life in his novel. This was 
Ellison‘s critique of ―narrow naturalism,‖ and Baldwin‘s objection to protest novels, and 
also why both expressed so much disaffection with sociology, as they felt that these 
paradigms functioned by compressing black people into a set of unavoidably de-
individualized, and, therefore, inevitably inauthentic, types. They rejected Bigger‘s 
authenticity on the grounds that as a stereotype he represented nothing more than a 
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pernicious racist fantasy, and worse, they charged that by depicting such an image Wright 
was merely perpetuating its racist implications.   
 In ―Spectacle and Event in Native Son‖ Jonathan Elmer suggests that in the 
critical debate surrounding the novel, critics persist in conflating Bigger‘s limitations as a 
character with Wright‘s limitations as a writer. In ―How Bigger Was Born,‖ Wright even 
seems to invite this confusion by paralleling his own consciousness with Bigger‘s, 
disclosing, for example, that while he was writing the novel, ―Like Bigger himself, I felt 
a mental censor…standing over me, draped in white‖ (448). Not only does Wright 
explicitly compare himself to Bigger here, his description immediately evokes the ―white 
blur‖ of Mrs. Dalton, draped in a flowing white gown, who haunts Bigger‘s 
consciousness throughout the novel.  As Elmer rightly observes, this deliberate 
comparison has resulted in a critical slippage wherein Bigger‘s limitations are often cited 
as evidence of the novel‘s limitations, or of Wright‘s own artistic shortcomings, and vice 
versa. For example, many early reviewers paternalistically dismissed the novel‘s aesthetic 
flaws by reference to Wright‘s race, and indicated that any perpetuation of stereotypes 
was inadvertent on Wright‘s part, the effect of ignorance (read lack of education) or 
subconsciously absorbed racism (read lack of intellectual sophistication). Clifton 
Fadiman advances this notion through a classic paralepsis, dismissing the ―numerous 
defects‖ of the novel on the basis that Wright was ―not a finished writer…That he 
received the most rudimentary schooling, that for most of his life he has been an aimless 
itinerant worker‖ (Reilly 50). These early critics somewhat perversely suggest that the 
source of Wright‘s most significant achievement – his authentic representation of the 
black experience – was also the source of his aesthetic flaws.   
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 Such evaluations of Native Son quite condescendingly imply that Wright was 
unaware of the factitious origins of the stereotypes that he was deploying and the risks 
inherent in deploying them. But the explanation that Wright gives of why he decided that 
the plot of the novel should include this stereotype discredits any such accusations. He 
explains in ―How Bigger Was Born‖ that innocent Negro boys are ―picked up on the 
streets and carted off to jail and charged with ‗rape‘‖ so often that the image of the black 
rapist had become a ―symbol of the Negro‘s uncertain position in America‖ (455). 
Wright‘s declaration that most of these young men are, in fact, quite innocent, and his 
offsetting the charge of ―rape‖ in quotations, makes it clear that he knows that this 
stereotype has virtually no basis in truth. Furthermore, he explicitly acknowledges that 
this image gleans its power through its ceaseless repetitions in the legal system and in the 
media. Wright even declares that the burden of representation was foremost on his mind 
when he sat down to write the novel, revealing that he worried ―What will white people 
think if I draw the picture of such a Negro boy? Will they not at once say: ‗See, didn't we 
tell you all along that niggers are like that?‘‖ (448). His comments indicate the he was 
more than aware of the political import of re-presenting this nefarious ―stereotype‖ in his 
own novel. 
 Given that Wright undoubtedly recognized the fact that he was drawing on a 
racist and fictitious stereotype, the most pressing critical question is why he chooses to do 
so. Baldwin and Ellison suggest that the novel reveals bad faith in black humanity on 
Wright‘s part. But this accusation conflates Wright‘s representations of racist stereotypes 
with his acceptance of them. Such allegations likely stem from their belief that Wright 
was committed to a purely naturalist aesthetic in his writing that restricted him to 
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representing sociological ―truths.‖ Baldwin had implied as much in ―Everybody‘s Protest 
Novel‖ when he criticized Wright by declaring that, ―literature and sociology are not one 
and the same…it is impossible to discuss them as if they were‖ (31). This assumption 
about Wright‘s aesthetic objectives dates back to the novel‘s publication, when reviewers 
consistently cited Wright‘s stylistic debt to naturalism – variously comparing him to 
Zola, Dreiser, and Steinbeck (Gates and Appiah 8-9, 21). This critical bond between 
Native Son and naturalism, for good or ill, is so strong, that twenty years later, Irving 
Howe lamented that the waning popularity of naturalism had relegated Wright‘s novel to 
the dustbin of literary history (Gates and Appiah 65).  
 Baldwin and Ellison took issue with Wright‘s methodology because they believed 
that sociologically derived portraits simply could not capture the full humanity, the 
disquiet complexity, the savage paradox of the black American experience. Instead, they 
felt that these portraits pawned off ―formulaic fictions‖ as true representations of black 
life. In his eagerness to pursue a sociological or naturalist aesthetic in Native Son, 
Baldwin charged, Wright had merely represented ―fantasies, connecting nowhere with 
reality‖ (31). In their own works, Baldwin and Ellison hoped to counter the violence that 
sociology and naturalism perpetuated by reducing individuals to socio-cultural symbols. 
They believed that literature could best serve political ends simply by being true to the 
complexity of the human experience. In essay after essay, they affirm that aesthetics must 
enjoy some degree of autonomy from political concerns, because the role of the author is 
to produce literature that conveys a deeper truth about life, not to turn out sociological or 
political tracts, as they alleged Wright had done.  
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 But Baldwin and Ellison‘s affirmations echo, rather than contravene, Wright‘s 
own aesthetic goals. In his 1937 essay ―Blueprint for Negro Writing,‖ published shortly 
before he began work on Native Son, Wright reveals his own artistic objectives and 
outlines his thoughts on politics and aesthetics in African American literature. Contrary 
to Baldwin and Ellison‘s accusations, Wright devotes an entire section of his essay to the 
―autonomy of craft,‖ in which he argues that ―the Negro writers‘ new position calls for a 
sharper definition of the status of craft, and a sharper emphasis upon its functional 
autonomy‖ (105). He concludes that the task facing this new generation of black writers 
cannot be solved by ―a simple literary realism‖ (101). He even cautions writers against 
viewing literature as a social mirror, explaining that ―the relationship between reality and 
the artistic image is not always direct and simple,‖ and warning that ―A too literal 
translation of experience into images is a defeat for imaginative expression. And a 
vulgarized simplicity constitutes the greatest danger‖ (105). Turning back to Wright‘s 
essay, Cheryl Wall points out that Wright ―was no simpleton when it came to matters of 
representation,‖ and while he, ―called for simplicity in presentation, he disparaged the 
simplistic‖ (290).  Rather, in his own words, his goal was to portray, in a simple and 
straightforward manner, ―all the complexity, the strangeness, the magic wonder of life 
that plays like a bright sheen over even the most sordid existence;‖ an aesthetic he 
described as ―complex simplicity‖ (103).   
 In ―Blueprint‖ Wright not only affirms the autonomy of craft, he also provides a 
succinct description of his own aesthetic idiom: ―complex simplicity.‖ This playfully 
ambiguous phrase evokes the African American aesthetic of double-voicedness that 
literary scholar Henry Louis Gates, Jr. would describe fifty years later as ―signifyin(g).‖ 
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In his foundational text The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of African-American Literary 
Criticism (1988), Gates successfully transfers the historically linguistic practice of 
signifyin(g) in black vernacular to African American literary discourse and criticism. 
Pointing to two key figures of double-voicedness in African, Afro-diasporic and African 
American culture, Esu Elegbara and the Signifying Monkey, Gates argues that double-
voicedness is a fundamental tenet of the African American literary tradition. He explains 
that together, Esu Elegbara, who functions through double-voiced utterances, and the 
Signifying Monkey, who functions through rhetorical tropes, formal revision and 
intertextuality, represent the literary practice of signifyin(g). 
 Gates draws on Mikhail Bakhtin‘s notion of the ―double-voiced‖ utterance (whose 
origins are indigenous to African and Afro-diasporic cultures) to develop his theory of 
signifyin(g). Bakhtin defines a double-voiced word as that which works ―by inserting a 
new semantic orientation into a…word which already has--and retains--its own 
orientation‖ (50). Gates also cites Gary Morson‘s analysis of Bakhtin, who argues that in 
the double-voiced sign the listener/reader comprehends ―both a version of the original 
utterance as the embodiment of the speaker‘s point of view (or ‗semantic position‘) and 
the second speaker‘s evaluation of that utterance from a different point of view‖ (50). In 
short, signifyin(g), Gates asserts, is a kind of  literary ―black doublevoicedness‖ 
(51).While signifyin(g) can manifest itself in a variety of ways, Gates locates two classes 
of double-voicedness that are the most germane to Wright‘s project in Native Son: 
tropological revision and the speakerly text. Gates defines tropological revision as ―the 
manner in which a specific trope is repeated, with differences‖ (xxv). He points to 
doubling, figures of the double, and particularly double-consciousness as one of the most 
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salient tropes at play in the African American canon. The speakerly text refers to African 
American writers‘ preoccupation with representing the speaking black subject in writing. 
In particular, Gates points to Zora Neale Hurston‘s use of ―free indirect discourse‖ in 
Their Eyes Were Watching God as a poignant example of the manner in which African 
American authors manipulate narrative strategy to produce a ―play of voices‖ in their 
works (xxv). 
 Parody and the related concept of hidden polemic are also fundamental to Gates‘s 
theorization of signifyin(g). Beginning with the Princeton Encylopedia of Poetry and 
Poetics’s definition of parody as ―exaggerated imitation,‖ or ―a form of literary criticism 
which consists in heightening the characteristics of the thing imitated,‖ Gates 
differentiates parody from imitation proper. Unlike direct imitation, parody forwards a 
critique of the very thing it resembles; in other words, through exaggeration parody 
conveys a sense of derision for the subject of representation. Of course some of the most 
pernicious representations of African Americans take the form of parody, in which racist 
assumptions about black character are magnified, often for comedic or political effect. 
But, as Gates points out, ―if blacks were the subject of this sort of racist Signifyin(g) 
parody,‖ they were also quite capable of using tropological revision themselves to signify 
―upon white racism through parody.‖ (94). This type of parody constitutes ―hidden or 
internal polemic,‖ another concept that Gates pulls from Bakhtin. Bakhtin explains that in 
hidden or internal polemic, 
  the other speech act remains outside the bounds of the author‘s speech, but 
  is implied or alluded to in that speech…In hidden polemic, the author‘s  
  discourse is oriented towards its referential object, as in any other   
  discourse, but at the same time each assertion about that object is   
  construed in such a way that, besides its referential meaning, the author‘s  
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  discourse brings a polemical attack to bear against another speech act,  
  another assertion on the same topic (111). 
 
Parody and hidden polemic are two forms of double-voiced discourse that Gates 
identifies as ―formal signifyin(g),‖ in which black writers include ―a fairly exact 
repetition of a given narrative or rhetorical structure, filled incongruously with a 
ludicrous or incongruent content‖ (103).  Formal signifyin(g) can also function 
conversely, wherein an author ―suggests a given structure precisely by failing to coincide 
with it – that is, suggests it by dissemblance‖ (104).  For example, Gates points out that in 
Invisible Man, Ellison, ―signifies upon Wright by parodying Wright‘s literary structures 
through repetition and difference‖ (107). In other words, he simultaneously evokes and 
critiques Wright‘s novel through aesthetic dissimulation.3 Ellison himself described this 
type of signifyin(g) as ―technical assault against the styles which have gone before‖ 
(107). 
 According to Gates, literary signifyin(g) constitutes, ―successive attempts at 
creating a new narrative space for representing the recurring referent of African 
American literature, the so-called Black Experience‖ through signifyin(g) (111). For 
example, while Ellison and Wright were both preoccupied with the representing the 
―black experience,‖ by his own admission, Ellison‘s objective was to supersede Wright 
by implicitly underscoring the inadequacies of his representations. Signifyin(g), Gates 
explains, serves to ―create a space for the revising text,‖ which is ―written in the language 
of the tradition, employing its tropes, its rhetorical strategies, and its ostensible subject 
matter, the so-called Black Experience,‖ so that it can supplant them (124).  Through 
                                                          
3
 For example, according to Gates, the title of Ellison’s Invisible Man obliquely references and rewrites the 
titles of Wright’s books Black Boy and Native Son, inverting the material presence of the black native with 
the absence of invisibility, just as Ellison replaces Wright’s voiceless protagonist in Native Son with a 
narrator who is nothing but voice (106). 
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repetition, revision, parody, ambiguity, and doubling, signifyin(g) provides black authors 
with a powerful strategy that is at once aesthetic and political.    
 Although The Signifying Monkey appeared decades after Wright began writing his 
novel, one can easily find traces of something similar to Gates‘s description of 
signifyin(g) in Wright‘s works. In ―Blueprint,‖ for example, he affirms the centrality of 
repetition in black culture, which he argues achieved its expression in the form of stories 
―recounted from mouth to mouth‖ (99). The trope of doubles and doubling also surfaces 
throughout the essay: the African American writer‘s unique position provides her with 
two perspectives, two literary traditions, two audiences, which must be assimilated and 
reconciled in her project. It is only by drawing on this ―complex consciousness‖ Wright 
argues, that black writers can ―do justice to their subject matter‖ (102). It is these 
observations that lead Wright to conclude that an aesthetic of ―complex simplicity‖ is 
most appropriate for the manifold task ahead of the black writer, the phrase itself evoking 
many of the fundamental characteristics of signifyin(g): ambiguity, word play, paradox, 
indirection, layers of meaning, double-entendre, equivocation, etc.    
 These considerations were surely on Wright‘s mind when he began work on 
Native Son, just six months after publishing ―Blueprint.‖ Indeed, the very title of 
Wright‘s novel is a sort of double-voiced utterance, as the phrase ―native son‖ 
simultaneously others the protagonist and affirms his nativism. By suturing the racially 
inflected term ―native‖ to ―son,‖ Wright signifies on a set of politically and racially 
loaded concepts in American culture: the ―black boy‖ and the ―founding fathers.‖ This 
sense of ambiguity surfaces in Wright‘s explanatory essay, ―How Bigger Was Born,‖ as 
he describes the novel through a series of indeterminacies and equivocations. For 
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example, he describes Bigger as a ―symbolic figure of American life‖ only to obscure 
that symbolism by multiplying the ―Bigger type‖ ad infinitum: Bigger Thomas is not only 
black, he is white too, not just Southern, but also Northern, and not just American, but 
German and Russian as well. By the end of the essay the Bigger type is ubiquitous, ―there 
are literally millions of him everywhere‖ (441).  Wright also makes it clear in the essay 
that although Bigger is meant to represent something larger than himself – of course, his 
very name suggests as much – he is nonetheless, and perhaps, first and foremost, a 
person. He not only explains that he intended to ―make [Bigger] a living personality and 
at the same time a symbol of all the larger things I felt and saw in him,‖ he even provides 
a nuanced description of each person who inspired his representation of Bigger (448).    
 Wright‘s description complicates readings that deem Bigger a symbol by 
divesting him of his individuality or stripping him of his personhood. The Oxford English 
Dictionary provides a few definitions of the word ―personality‖ that are cogent to my 
argument here: ―the quality, character, or fact of being a person, as distinct from an 
animal, thing, or abstraction; a person, esp. one considered as the possessor of individual 
characteristics or qualities; a being resembling or having the nature of a person, esp. by 
having self-awareness or consciousness.‖ These definitions reveal something fascinating 
about Wright‘s choice of words: the OED‘s definitions for ―personality‖ sets up a binary 
opposition between person and abstraction, individual and symbol, defining them as more 
or less mutually exclusive. By making Bigger a ―living personality and at the same time a 
symbol,‖ Wright is simultaneously affirming that Bigger is a human and stripping him of 
his humanity, he is emitting a double-voiced utterance. Like his playfully ambiguous 
―complex simplicity,‖ he describes Bigger paradoxically, as both a thing and its opposite.  
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 If we take Wright‘s comments in ―Blueprint‖ and his explanatory essay ―How 
Bigger Was Born‖ to heart, then the reductive readings that Baldwin, Ellison, Howe, and 
even my classmates have offered are surely missing the point. What is needed, then, is an 
analysis of Native Son that takes Wright‘s own stated aesthetic objectives as its starting 
point. Tuhkanen, the Wright scholar with whom I opened this essay, is not the first to 
observe that a more rigorously nuanced reading of Native Son is imperative. In fact, noted 
literary scholar Houston Baker called for such readings nearly twenty-five years ago in 
his seminal work Blues, Ideology and Afro-American Literature (1987) when he asserted 
that Wright‘s project could ―only be understood through the deconstruction of the quite 
familiar (and lamentably narrow) modes of assessing his corpus that have held sway for 
decades‖ (140). Gates had described the importance of signifyin(g) precisely because he 
felt that the African American literary tradition had suffered from a lack of sophisticated 
scholarly attention, and that the scholarly attention it did receive failed to approach works 
by black Americans on their own terms. In Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the 
Literary Imagination (1992), Toni Morrison similarly argues that literary criticism‘s 
position of universalized whiteness has resulted in misreadings of much canonical 
literature. These misreadings stem from the critical praxis of ―American Africanism‖ that 
she describes in the book as the ―disabling virus within literary discourse,‖ and defines as 
―the denotative and connotative blackness that African peoples have come to signify, as 
well as the entire range of views, assumptions, readings and misreadings that accompany 
Eurocentric learning about these people‖ (xx). Baldwin had hinted at the flaccidity of 
critical approaches to black literature several decades earlier in ―Everybody‘s Protest 
Novel,‖ arguing that readers are all too quick to dismiss ―whatever violence they [black 
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writers] do to language, whatever excessive demands they make of credibility‖ because 
readers ―receive a very definite thrill of virtue from the fact that we are reading such a 
book at all‖ (31). Ellison had also sounded these complaints in ―The World and the Jug,‖ 
opening his essay with a triad of provocative questions about the racist assumptions 
underlying many of the critical approaches to African American literature, asking: 
  [Why] is it so often true that when critics confront the American as Negro  
  they suddenly drop their advanced critical armament and revert with an air 
  of confident superiority to quite primitive modes of analysis? Why is it  
  that sociology-oriented critics seem to rate literature so far below politics  
  and ideology that they would  rather kill a novel than modify their   
  presumptions concerning a given reality which it seeks in its own terms to  
  project? Finally, why is it that so many of those who would tell us the  
  meaning of Negro life never bother to learn how varied it really is? (107). 
 
But it is precisely Baldwin‘s and Ellison‘s trenchant insights into the lack of rigor in 
critical approaches to African American literature that leave me so disoriented by their 
own reductive readings of Wright‘s novel. And my classmates‘s own responses, coupled 
with a survey of recent scholarship published on the novel, lend at least some credence to 
Tuhkanen‘s concerns that I cited at the beginning of this paper about the inherited 
preconceptions that haunt Wright‘s novel. It seems that Wright‘s legacy, his reputation 
and critical reception, quite unfortunately precede him to the point that ―lamentably 
narrow‖ modes of assessing his novel do continue to hold sway.   
 Much of these ―lamentably narrow‖ readings of Native Son hinge on the issue of 
genre and Wright‘s reputation as a naturalist, a fact which is often taken for granted by 
critics. In general, Wright does present his method in Native Son as descending from the 
school of naturalism that Zola had championed in his well-known essay ―The 
Experimental Novel‖ (1879). Zola advocates a method in which the novelist acts not 
merely as an observer, but as an experimental scientist, placing his characters in 
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particular situations in order to record their responses. Such a method ultimately gleans 
its significance when the characters are established as real in some way, and this is 
precisely the assertion that Wright makes in ―How Bigger Was Born‖: that Bigger is 
essentially – we might say sociologically – real. Certainly, Wright took pains to establish 
the veracity of the novel‘s basic topography, returning to Chicago in November of 1938 
to take notes and photographs, and to interview a local lawyer about court procedures. 
Ernie‘s Kitchen Shack (where Bigger, Mary and Jan eat dinner) – identified in the novel 
as being located at Forty-seventh Street and Indiana – refers to an actual restaurant in 
Chicago called ―The Chicken Shack‖ that was located at 4647 Indiana Ave. and owned 
by a man named Ernie Henderson (Kinnamon 67). In point of fact, Wright cites the 
influence of naturalist writers such as Zola, Dreiser and Crane on his thinking, and he 
further notes that ―the most important discoveries came when I veered from fiction 
proper into the fields of psychology and sociology…I studied tables of figures relating 
population density to insanity, relating housing to disease, relating school and 
recreational opportunities to crime, relating various forms of neurotic behavior to 
environment…‖ (Black Boy 278). Accordingly, Wright describes writing the novel in 
―How Bigger Was Born‖ as a kind of sociological investigation. 
 At the same time, however, early reviewers were quick to tally the novel‘s flaws 
as a naturalist text. For example ―New York Times‖ book critic, Orville Prescott, 
lamented that ―instead of a realistic sociological document he [Wright] had written a 
philosophical novel, its ideas dramatized by improbable coincidences and symbolical 
characters‖ (Reilly 293). After reading a draft of the novel that Wright submitted to his 
publisher in February 1939, his agent Paul Reynolds, Jr. responded with a list of 
  
22 
 
―weaknesses‖ in the novel based on their implausibility, including ―Jan‘s pardon of 
Bigger, some unbelievable aspects of Mary‘s character…[and] the extreme naïveté in 
trusting a new chauffeur to bring their [the Daltons] daughter home in the middle of the 
night‖ (Fabre 177). Another example of plot that commonly warrants skepticism is the 
unlikely coincidence that Bigger sees Mary Dalton for the first time in the movie theater 
on the morning of the very same day that he is hired by her father as a chauffeur and that 
ends with him accidentally killing her. But the most infamously ludicrous and therefore 
oft-cited scene occurs early in Book 3, when virtually every character in the novel crowds 
into Bigger‘s jail cell at the same time – Reverend Hammond, Jan, Max, Buckley, Mr. 
and Mrs. Dalton, Bigger‘s mother, his brother Buddy and his sister Vera, as well as his 
friends Jack, G.H., and Gus, all squeeze into what must be one of the largest jail cells run 
by one of the most lenient and indulgent prisons in American literature.  
 As I recounted beforehand, early reviewers paternalistically explained that these 
flaws were due to Wright‘s naïveté or lack of education. But contrary to these critics‘ 
assumptions about his artistic crudity, Wright was fully aware of the flaws that these 
reviewers were so quick to highlight and then eagerly dismiss as the result of ignorance. 
For example, in response to Reynolds‘s criticisms, Wright conceded ―nine-tenths of what 
you say is correct‖ but he nonetheless chose to leave many of these alleged ―weaknesses‖ 
in the cherished novel that he had gone to such great pains to systematically research and 
develop (Fabre 177). Thus, it seems unlikely that such inconsistencies were inadvertent 
on Wright‘s part.  In fact, sounding much more like a modernist expressionist than a 
―narrow naturalist,‖ he typically justified these narrative improbabilities as intentional 
departures from a strict realism designed to achieve certain emotional or expressive 
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effects.  For example, in ―How Bigger Was Born‖ Wright acknowledges the 
implausibility of the overcrowded jail scene, but explains that ―I wanted those people in 
that cell to elicit a certain important emotional response from Bigger. And so the scene 
stood. I felt that what I wanted that scene to say to the reader was more important than its 
surface reality or plausibility‖ (italics mine 458). He goes on to state that in writing the 
novel he was less concerned with the verisimilitude of particular details than with how 
successfully those details achieved the desired effect, revealing that ―If a scene felt 
improbable to me, I‘d not tear it up, but ask myself: ‗Does it reveal enough of what I feel 
to stand in spite of its unreality?‘‖ (italics mine 458). The most fictitious elements of 
Native Son, then, are a mechanism that Wright strategically employs, not inadvertent 
oversights or evidence of his woefully inadequate formal education.  
 Of course it is easy to mistake the fallacious nature of Wright‘s representations 
with the literal truth of the resulting picture. Since, by his own admission, Wright is 
paradoxically committed to both a strict realism and an uncompromised expressionism, 
it‘s not surprising that readers might confuse one mode with the other. Actually, this even 
seems to be Wright‘s intention. For example, the description of Bigger that appears in the 
Chicago Tribune’s coverage of his trial in Part 3 represents such an exaggerated example 
of racism that it seems to exceed hyperbole: 
  His shoulders are huge, muscular, and he keeps hunched, as if about to  
  spring upon you at any moment…All in all, he seems a beast utterly  
  untouched by the softening influences of modern civilization. In speech  
  and manner he lacks the charm of the average, hapless, genial, grinning  
  Southern darky so beloved by the American people.  
  The moment the killer made his appearance at the inquest, there were  
  shouts of ―Lynch ‗im! Kill ‗im!‖  
  But the brutish Negro seemed indifferent to his fate, as though inquests,  
  trials, and even the looming certainty of the electric chair held no terror for 
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  him. He acted like an earlier missing link in the human species. He  
  seemed out of place in the white man‘s civilization. 
  An Irish police captain remarked with deep conviction: ―I‘m convinced  
  that death is the only cure for the likes of him‖ (Native Son 323). 
 
Writing in The University of Kansas City Review, Hubert Creekmore – like Wright, a 
native of Mississippi, and of the same age, but white – criticized the newspaper accounts 
in the novel, declaring that they ―exceed belief…Mr. Wright makes them present 
incidents and ideas which reflect his own mind rather than an editor‘s mind or the public 
mind‖ (qtd. in Kinnamon 69). Of course, it is now widely known that the newspaper 
articles in Native Son are directly culled from the Chicago Tribune’s coverage of the 
arrest and trial of Robert Nixon, an eighteen-year-old black man who was accused of 
killing a white woman, Florence Johnson, with a brick in May of 1938. Nixon confessed 
to the crime, as well as a number of other attacks, most likely under torture, and although 
he ultimately pled not guilty for the crimes at his arraignment, he was speedily convicted 
by an all-white jury and executed by electrocution on June 15, 1939. Although Wright 
downplays the influence of the case on Native Son, after hearing about Nixon he sent a 
letter to Margaret Walker, one of his colleagues in Chicago, pronouncing ―I have just 
learned of a case in Chicago that has broken there and is exactly like the story I am trying 
to write. See if you can get the newspaper clippings and send them to me‖ (qtd. in Gayle 
113). A review of the newspaper clippings that Wright had in his possession reveals that 
the newspaper reports featured in the novel are virtual reproductions of the Tribune’s 
coverage of the Nixon case: 
  He has none of the charm of speech or manner that is characteristic of so  
  many Southern darkies. That charm is the mark of civilization, and so far  
  as manner and appearance go, civilization has left Nixon practically  
  untouched. His hunched shoulders and long sinewy arms that dangle  
  almost to his knees; his out-thrust head and catlike tread all suggest the  
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  animal. He is very black – almost pure Negro. His physical characteristics  
  suggest an earlier link in the species… 
  Last week when he was taken…to demonstrate how he had slain Mrs.  
  Florence Johnson…a crowd gathered and there were cries of ―Lynch him!  
  Kill him!‖ 
  …Nixon either doesn‘t realize the gravity of his position or doesn‘t care.  
  He will worry about the chair when the time comes… 
  [The Louisiana sheriff of Nixon‘s home parish writes,] ―It has been  
  demonstrated here that nothing can be done with Robert Nixon. Only  
  death can cure him‖ 
(Chicago Sunday Tribune, June 5, 1938, p. 6). 
 
These outlandish, but nonetheless factual, accounts are interlarded with the 
aforementioned unrealistic scenes that, despite their implausibility, Wright chose to 
preserve on the basis that they conveyed an expressionistic truth. By deliberately and 
ambiguously blending realist and expressionist modes, Wright seems intent on provoking 
reader skepticism. But why would Wright desire such a response from his readers? In 
―Beyond Naturalism?‖ (1975),  Michel Fabre argues that Wright‘s propensity to blend 
fact and fiction stems from his ―pleasure in discovering that reality is often more fiction-
like than fiction itself and in persuading the reader of this‖ (66). Creekmore‘s mistaken 
belief that the Chicago Tribune would surely never print such racist sensationalism points 
to this effect: one can imagine that an incredulous reader like Creekmore, faced with the 
original newspaper articles that served as Wright‘s sources, might be shocked all the 
more by their basis in reality, this sudden jolt perhaps prompting a shift in consciousness 
that Wright was aiming for.    
 Contrary to the critical contention that the stylistic inconsistency of Native Son is 
one of its flaws, these inconsistencies are better understood as strategic departures from 
the conventions of naturalism on Wright‘s part. This manipulation of genre recalls 
Gates‘s description of formal signifyin(g) in which an author signifies on another text by 
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repeating its ―given narrative or rhetorical structure,‖ but filling it with ―incongruent 
content‖ (103). By drawing on both realistic and expressionist techniques, Wright‘s novel 
itself can be viewed as double-voiced as it communicates through two different, and in 
some ways competing, modes of representation. The above passage from the novel in 
which Wright draws on an article from the Chicago Tribune also constitutes tropological 
signifyin(g), because although Wright nearly reproduces the original article, he does 
make slight changes. For example, he rearranges the order of the sentences, adds and 
removes some words/phrases, swaps out the Louisiana sheriff for an Irish police captain, 
and changes the ―Lynch him! Kill him!‖ of the original article to ―Lynch ‗im! Kill ‗im!‖ 
in the version that appears in the novel. While these changes may seem insubstantial, on 
further inspection this subtle editing produces quite a different effect. For example, by 
replacing the Louisiana sheriff with an Irish police captain, Wright more explicitly 
racializes the uniformed figure as Anglo-European. Wright also calls the cultural or 
intellectual sophistication of the onlookers into question by rendering their violent refrain 
into vernacular speech (dropping the ‗h‘ from the ‗him‘), essentially inflicting the same 
kind of representational violence on the lynch mob that the journalists who penned the 
original article had perpetrated against Bigger.
4
 Coupled with the rest of the changes that 
he makes to the original article, Wright‘s subtle revisions turn the representation of Nixon 
as an inhuman savage in the original article on its head. In Wright‘s version we have a 
quite passive Bigger Thomas bookended by a bloodthirsty mob and a homicidal Irish 
police chief. Wright‘s added suggestion that the rather halcyon Bigger ―seemed out of 
place in the white man‘s civilization‖ seems nothing short of ironic. These revisions 
                                                          
4
 This is not to say that vernacular speech suggests a lack of cultural or intellectual sophistication, or that 
Wright believed it did. On the contrary, by playing with the division between civilized and uncivilized in his 
revision of the article, Wright seems to be calling those very assumptions into question. 
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allow Wright to reproduce the newspaper articles, while simultaneously clearing a space 
for himself to subtly critique the racist views that they contain within that representation; 
in other words, signifyin(g) allows Wright to represent racism without condoning it.       
 Signifyin(g) reframes the supposed flaws of Wright‘s novel as deliberate attempts 
to intervene in specific methods of representation. Indeed by his own admission, Wright 
drew on a particular genre‘s aesthetic conventions in Native Son only to the point that 
they were effective, and simply abandoned its method of representation for another when 
and where he felt that it was inadequate. In an analysis that resonates with Gates‘ 
explication of signifyin(g), Frank D. McConnell asserts that in African American 
literature ―not only the plot, but also the language itself of the economic and social world, 
generating and generated by the novel, is available to the American black writer only as 
an acquired form, just as his existence in that social world is an acquisition rather than a 
birthright. And this means that its conventions can be employed only insofar as they are 
simultaneously tested‖ (195-6). Wright‘s departures from these ―acquired forms‖ then, 
forward an implicit critique about the limitations of the literary traditions that he had 
inherited, suggesting that, in the end, even the writers who inspired him did not provide 
the tools necessary to adequately represent the African American experience. Wright‘s 
deviations from conventional naturalism, in other words, the ―defects‖ in the novel‘s 
naturalism, are precisely the moments that reveal Wright‘s critique of conventional 
naturalism.  
 To fully comprehend Wright‘s critique of naturalism, it is helpful to consider 
critical accounts of the genre‘s conventions. In general, naturalist writers attempted to 
show how social and economic conditions, rather than biology, determine a person‘s 
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character. Donald Pizer argues that American naturalists were particularly interested in 
depicting the way that pervasive and deterministic social and material realities 
circumscribed consciousness. Wright‘s project in Native Son was undoubtedly inspired 
by similar concerns. In ―How Bigger Was Born‖ he explains that, ―I don‘t mean to say 
that I think that environment makes consciousness…but I do say that I felt that the 
environment supplies the instrumentalities though which the organism expresses itself, 
and if that environment is warped…the mode and manner of behavior will be affected 
(442). In order to convince readers of the need for social reform, naturalist authors  
often depict characters who lead brutal and miserable lives, because as naturalist scholar 
June Howard explains, ―if the victim‘s lot is sordid, the need for reform is proved‖ (38).  
 As a politically engaged artist, intent on social change, it comes as no surprise 
Wright saw merits in the naturalist project. But he had expressed at least minimal 
disaffection with the genre‘s propensity for objectification when he criticized Stephen 
Crane‘s naturalist masterpiece Maggie: A Girl of the Streets, calling it a ―coldly 
materialistic piece of poverty‖ (qtd. in Fabre 48). Wright‘s reservations about the 
unalloyed naturalism of Crane‘s novella anticipate Howard‘s conclusion that in their 
commitment to narrative objectivity, naturalist authors undercut the political and moral 
efficacy of their own works. She argues that the ―objective, analytic attitude proposed by 
the aesthetic ideology of realism and even more emphatically by naturalism…effectively 
dehumanizes the character,‖ stripping her of selfhood and allowing the reader to view her 
as an objectified Other (81). This detachment from the characters undercuts the genre‘s 
political objectives, she argues, because it inhibits the moral imperatives of the work 
from penetrating the readers‘ consciousness, ―enough to cause real discomfort‖ (Howard 
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102). In other words, the narrative distance positions the reader as a voyeur and the 
protagonist‘s miserable life as nothing more than a spectacle for the reader‘s gaze.5  
 To counter the voyeuristic effect of a purely naturalist aesthetic, Wright employs 
a more sophisticated narrative strategy in his novel. Unlike the impersonal tone of a 
detached third-person narrator, his novel is dominated by the perspective of its own 
protagonist. He explains, ―…as much as I could, I restricted the novel to what Bigger saw 
and felt, to the limits of his feeling and thoughts even when I was conveying more than 
that to the reader.‖ (459). Wright hoped that this would provide a more penetrating and 
personal account of Bigger‘s character, revealing that ―I had the notion that such a 
manner of rendering made for a sharper effect, a more pointed sense of the character, his 
peculiar type of being and consciousness.‖ (459). Allowing Bigger‘s point of view to 
pervade the narrative humanizes him, because it keeps readers grounded in his 
consciousness. But again, Wright equivocates when he claims that the novel is restricted 
to Bigger‘s point of view. Just moments before declaring, ―Throughout there is but one 
point of view: Bigger‘s,‖(459) he gives a decidedly more complicated account of his 
narrative strategy: 
  …sometimes I'd find it necessary to use a stream of consciousness   
  technique, then rise to an interior monologue, descend to a direct   
  rendering of a dream state, then to a matter-of-fact depiction of what  
  Bigger was saying, doing, and feeling. Then I'd find it impossible to say  
  what I wanted to say without stepping in and speaking outright on my  
  own; but when doing this I always made an effort to retain the mood of the 
  story, explaining everything only in terms of Bigger's life and, if   
  possible, in the rhythms of Bigger's thought (even though the words would 
  be mine). Again, at other times, in the guise of the lawyer's speech and the 
  newspaper items, or in terms of what Bigger would overhear or see from  
  afar, I'd give what others were saying and thinking of him (458). 
                                                          
5
 For example, the opening scene of the novel in which Bigger kills a large rat is described from a detached 
third-person perspective. Wright then describes the Thomas household in the same third-person narrative 
voice that the rat is described, effectively heightening the dehumanization of Bigger and his family. 
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In other words, Wright manipulates the narrative throughout the novel so that third-
person narration is mediated by Bigger‘s first-person perspective. Gates describes this 
narrative strategy, referred to as free indirect discourse, as a form of the speakerly text, 
―in which third and first person, oral and written voices, oscillate freely within one 
structure‖ (22). This ―double-voiced narrative,‖ he argues, shifts its level of diction to, 
―reflect a certain development of self-consciousness in a hybrid character, a character 
who is neither the novel‘s protagonist nor the text‘s disembodied narrator, but a blend of 
both, an emergent and merging moment of consciousness‖ (xxvi). Gates acknowledges 
Wright‘s use of free indirect discourse, only to dismiss it, commenting, ―Wright uses free 
indirect discourse to some extent in Native Son, but its diction is not informed by 
Bigger‘s speech‖ (192). For Gates, Wright‘s use of free indirect discourse is unsuccessful 
because the narrator‘s sophisticated voice and Bigger‘s vernacular speech never 
effectively merge. 
 While most critics comment on Wright‘s use of free indirect discourse only in 
passing, Laura Tanner provides an article-length investigation of these narrative shifts in 
her essay ―Uncovering the Magical Disguise of Language: The Narrative Presence in 
Richard Wright‘s Native Son‖ (1987). Like Gates, Tanner notes the linguistic disparity 
between Bigger and the narrator, but she argues that Wright deliberately juxtaposes the 
sophisticated voice of the narrator with Bigger‘s primitive diction in order to represent 
―their differing relationships to the master language‖ (146). Her argument ironically 
echoes Howard‘s analysis of Maggie – the very novel Wright had criticized for its 
dispassionate and ineffective narrative strategy. By juxtaposing the voices of, 
―unreasoning characters and a highly sophisticated narrator,‖ Crane‘s novel ―widens the 
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chasm between the ignorance and brutality of the slum dwellers and the literary 
sensibilities of the narrator and reader‖ (105). She continues that Crane‘s narrator ―makes 
no direct statements, but within the strict constraints of ironic implication [the narrator] 
achieves a subtlety of meaning utterly beyond the reach of the characters, whose meager 
vocabulary [and] distorted syntax…mark them as…unaware, inarticulate 
characters…quite incapable of self-analysis‖ (105).  
 But unlike Crane‘s novel, which is written from a purely journalistic third-person 
perspective, Wright uses free indirect discourse in such a way that it is often difficult to 
parse out Bigger‘s thoughts from the narrators because there are minimal textual clues as 
to when the shift in consciousness has occurred. For example, in the crowded jail scene 
that occurs in the last section of the novel, Bigger‘s thoughts are commingled with the 
narrator‘s in such a way that it is difficult to tell the two apart. Moved by his mother‘s 
pitiful state, Bigger implores her not to worry, declaring ―I‘ll be out of this in no time.‖ 
(297). Bigger‘s assertion is met with disbelief by his visitors: ―They were all staring at 
him in surprise. Buckley‘s lips were twisted in a faint smile. Jan and Max looked 
dismayed. Mrs. Dalton, white as the wall behind her, listened, open-mouthed. The 
preacher and Mr. Dalton were shaking their heads sadly‖ (297). Their incredulous 
responses indicate that Bigger is simply too dumb or too naïve to comprehend the gravity 
of his situation, a fact which even seems to garner him some sympathy. But his ridiculous 
declaration is followed by a piece of narration that is part interior monologue, part 
narrative commentary:  
  He was ashamed of what he had done; he should have been honest with  
  them. It had been a wild and foolish impulse that had made him try to  
  appear strong and innocent before them. Maybe they would remember him 
  only by those foolish words after they had killed him. His mother‘s eyes  
  
32 
 
  were sad and skeptical; but kind, patient, waiting for his answer. Yes; he  
  had to wipe out that lie, not only so that they might know the truth, but to  
  redeem himself in the eyes of those white faces behind his back along the  
  white wall (297-98). 
 
In this excerpt, it is difficult to tell when, or even if, a shift in consciousness has occurred; 
should these thoughts, which reveal a rather astute reflection, be accorded to Bigger, or 
the narrator, or both? Unlike Crane‘s Maggie, whose narrative strategy polarizes the 
characters and the narrator (and by extension the reader), Wright uses free indirect 
discourse to collapse this distance.  
 Gates and Tanner argue that this narrative assimilation doesn‘t actually occur 
because the disparity between Bigger‘s idiolect and the narrator‘s linguistic eloquence is 
never resolved. For example, after the somewhat sophisticated analysis in the passage 
above, Bigger ultimately mumbles ―There ain‘t nothing, Ma. But I‘m all right‖ (298). In 
other words, Gates and Tanner see Bigger‘s vernacular speech and general difficulty 
articulating himself as proof that he is intellectually incapable of such self-reflection. 
However, while the narrator‘s voice doesn‘t appear to be informed by Bigger‘s speech, 
that does not mean that it is not informed by Bigger‘s thoughts. In fact, this is precisely 
what Wright says, explaining that when he felt that when he felt he needed to say 
something that was beyond Bigger‘s verbal capabilities he would try do so ―in the 
rhythms of Bigger's thought (even though the words would be mine)‖ (458). This type of 
free indirect discourse highlights the distinction between consciousness/intellect and its 
verbal articulation, and creates a mental space that is not conclusively or exclusively 
Bigger‘s or the narrator‘s. The resulting interiority effect enables Wright to represent 
thoughts and feelings in such a way that they appear to be emanating from the deepest, 
unverbalized reaches of Bigger‘s mind. Critics such as Dorrit Cohn, J. Hillis Miller, 
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Geoffrey Leech and Mick Short have recognized that the interiority effect of this 
narrative strategy is unique in being able to give the impression that it can at once 
represent and preserve the inner depths of a character‘s mind. As Cohn observes, in the 
free indirect narration of inner depth the blended ―words‖ of the narrator and character 
appear to undergo a qualitative change and become the character‘s ―thoughts‖ – even as 
the latter remains ―suspended‖ on the ―threshold of verbalization‖ (103). Leech and Short 
add that by giving the impression that mental content is suspended between word and 
thought, this form of free indirect narration is most realistic, because its illusory nature 
resembles the experience of inner thought, which in real life, is hardly ever fully 
verbalized (255-280). These free indirect renderings of inner depth suggest what Bakhtin 
once described as an ―unrealized surplus of humanness‖ (36).  
 Although many of the critiques leveled at Wright revolve around questions of 
genre, some of the fundamental objections to his novel remain unresolved by 
interrogating his aesthetic interventions. For example, it remains to be seen why he 
chooses to write a novel about a black rapist and murderer, and whether or not in doing 
so he is merely perpetuating a racist fantasy. But if Wright‘s formal revisions suggest that 
he was attempting to intervene in specific methods of representation, then an 
investigation of stereotype actually seems fundamental to his project. In fact, a more 
attentive reading of the novel reveals that Wright‘s treatment of Bigger in the novel is 
just that, an investigation of stereotype, not merely a representation of it. For example, 
while Wright is certainly playing on the hysterically racist fantasy of the black man as 
nothing more than a predatory phallus, upon closer examination his portrayal of Bigger 
appears to be more a caricature than a realistic representation. Bordering on hyperbole, 
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Wright‘s exaggerated depiction of Bigger as an over-sexed, gratuitously violent brute, 
suggests the conventions of parody. This reframing of the novel alone would indicate that 
he intends his representation to signify a critique of the stereotype, and not an acceptance 
of its sociological truth.  But Wright even goes a step further, as the actual events that 
take place in the novel undermine his own exaggerated portrayal of Bigger. Although he 
is obviously meant to evoke the racist fantasy of the black man as a rapist and murderer 
of innocent white women, Bigger never actually rapes Mary, nor does he actually murder 
her (because Bigger accidentally kills Mary, his actions are more appropriately deemed 
manslaughter than murder).
6
 Because Wright stops short of having him actually rape and 
murder a white woman, Bigger is, quite literally, not a transparent representation of the 
racist stereotype that readers take him for. Of course readers often overlook (or dismiss) 
these facts because Wright deliberately obscures Bigger‘s innocence in the novel. For 
example, although Bigger doesn‘t actually rape Mary, the moments leading up to her 
death are saturated with sexual innuendo: 
  He eased his hand, the fingers spread wide, up the center of her back and  
  her face came toward him and her lips touched his, like something he had  
  imagined. He stood her on her feet and she swayed against him. He  
  tightened his arms as his lips pressed tightly against hers and he felt her  
  body moving strongly. The thought and conviction that Jan had had her a  
  lot flashed through his mind. He kissed her again and felt the sharp bones  
  of her hips move in a hard and veritable grind. Her mouth was open and  
  her breath came slow and deep (84).  
 
The sexual tension in this scene suggests that, if not for the sudden appearance of Mrs. 
Dalton, Bigger might have raped Mary, or that he was planning to. Jonathan Elmer notes 
that Bigger‘s suffocation of Mary is also described as if it were a rape: 
                                                          
6
 Although it varies from state to state, first degree murder is generally a killing that is deliberate and 
premeditated, second degree is deliberate killing in which premeditation is absent, and manslaughter 
which lacks premeditation and suggests that at most there was intent to harm rather than to kill. From: 
Black, Henry Campbell, and Bryan A. Garner. Black's Law Dictionary. St. Paul: West Group, 2001. Print.   
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  He grew tight and full, as though about to explode. Mary's finger- nails  
  tore at his hands and he caught the pillow and covered her entire face with  
  it, firmly. Mary‘s body surged upward and he pushed downward upon the  
  pillow with all of his weight, deter- mined that she must not move or make 
  any sound that would betray him. His eyes were filled with the white blur  
  moving toward him in the shadows of the room. Again Mary's body  
  heaved (97-98). 
 
By describing Mary‘s death, and the moments leading up to it in this way, Wright leaves 
readers with the sense that Bigger has committed rape, even though no rape has actually 
occurred. If this is not enough to divert readers from the fact that Mary‘s death is an 
accident, the horrific post-mortem dismemberment and incineration of her body probably 
overshadows any lingering doubts about Bigger‘s guilt.   
 Of course Bigger‘s innocence is most effectively obscured by one of the book‘s 
most troubling doubles: the actual rape and murder of Bessie that Bigger commits in 
Book Two. Wright describes the two scenes quite similarly, so that the violence Bigger 
inflicts on Bessie is a literal reenactment of the crime that he is assumed to have 
committed against Mary. In other words, Bessie‘s definite rape and murder stand in for 
the rape and murder of Mary that never occurred. But this conflation prioritizes Mary‘s 
victimization because it reduces Bessie to a piece of evidence, as if all that really matters 
here is Mary‘s death. Wright even dramatizes this during the trial when the malicious 
state‘s attorney Buckley parades Bessie‘s body through the courtroom as proof of 
Bigger‘s guilt. But even Bigger knows that Bessie‘s death, her disfigured body, doesn‘t 
really matter to observers: ―Though he had killed a black girl and a white girl, he knew 
that it would be for the death of the white girl that he would be punished. The black girl 
was merely ‗evidence.‘ And under it all he knew that the white people did not really care 
about Bessie‘s being killed‖ (331). Not only does Bigger‘s reflection point to the hazard 
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of allowing Bessie‘s victimization to stand in for Mary‘s (as readers often do), he also 
seems to understand more, to be more insightful about social dynamics here, than an 
unconscious brute should. 
 In tracing out the ambiguities and indeterminacies of the novel, what becomes 
clear is that Native Son is far more nuanced – stylistically, rhetorically, thematically – 
than many extant interpretations and criticisms acknowledge. Wright‘s aesthetic and 
tropological interventions position his novel more squarely in the African American 
tradition of signifyin(g), than Dreiser‘s narrow naturalism or Crane‘s hard-boiled realism. 
Nor does Wright‘s project fit unproblematically in the sociological mode that many 
critical approaches to the novel take for granted.  As Fabre shrewdly remarks, far from 
proving that Wright‘s novel is artistically flawed, ―his incursions into realms other than 
social realism proves only that there are elements in his writing which cannot be reduced 
to their [critics‘] favorite image of him as a hard-boiled naturalist‖ (World of RW 56). I 
would go one step further to suggest that, as a signifyin(g) text, readers‘ and critics‘ most 
common objections to the novel actually point to the moments when Wright‘s critical 
commentary is most salient. Of course, as Gates explains, signifyin(g) exacts a 
hermeneutical demand, because even the most simple of images and language in the 
signifyin(g) mode,  are actually quite rhetorically complex. This hermeneutical effect is 
why signifyin(g) functions as both a rhetorical system and as a theory of literary 
interpretation.  As such, following Gates, many critics have adopted signifyin(g) as an 
effective interpretive lens with which to approach many African American texts, whose 
artistic sophistication had remained largely unrecognized under the critical languor of 
Eurocentric systems of evaluation. 
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 But if signifyin(g) lends itself as an interpretive frame, its signal figure, Esu-
Elegabra, god of indeterminacy, is a ―metaphor for the uncertainties of explication, for 
the open-endedness of every literary text‖ (21). Esu‘s canonical tale ―The Two Friends,‖ 
epitomizes this aspect of interpretation. In the tale, two friends who have vowed eternal 
friendship together are working in adjacent fields when Esu suddenly appears wearing a 
cloth cap that is black on one side and white on the other side. Esu speaks to the friends 
who can each only see one half of the cap from their position. Afterwards, the two friends 
fall to arguing about the color of the hat, calling each other blind and crazy because each 
could only see one half of the hat and is sure that the other is wrong. Just as the quarrel 
reaches its peak, Esu appears and shows the friends that the cap was actually two-sided, 
that neither friend was correct and that neither friend was wrong. Esu‘s tale not only 
illustrates the indeterminacy of interpretation, it also reveals that meaning is at least 
partially determined by vantage point and the mode one employs to see. In this way, Esu 
resonates with contemporary literary theorists who have turned to the reader‘s role in 
determining meaning. For example, in The Act of Reading (1978), Wolfgang Iser 
delineates a theory of aesthetic response in which literary meaning is produced in the 
interaction between a text and its reader. According to Iser, interpretation is a dynamic 
process that occurs as a reader arrives at a meaning by simultaneously responding to the 
text‘s own promptings and creatively filling in textual gaps and ambiguities. Closed texts, 
that represent a perspective on reality without ambiguity or tension, he explains, have a 
didactic function and seek to generate a particular response from the reader. The role of 
the reader in a closed text is limited to determining what is being communicated and then 
responding positively or negatively to that message. By contrast, open texts contain gaps 
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and ambiguities such that meaning is generated through the interaction that occurs when 
a reader resolves those ambiguities.
7
         
 While Gates explains that signifyin(g) ―clears a space‖ for the author or artist, Iser 
points out that that space, what he refers to as textual ―blanks,‖ also beg the reader‘s 
participation in generating meaning. In other words, as Esu‘s tale of the Two Friends 
demonstrated, Iser recognizes that meaning is mediated by both the text and its reader. 
Although the text itself determines meaning to some extent, resolving the blanks, he 
explains, is the activity of the reader, because a definitive answer is not supplied by the 
text.  As a result, blanks increase the interpretative possibilities for any given text, whose 
meaning is dependent on how the reader resolves the textual blanks and ambiguities.
8
 
However, while there is a plurality of options for resolving ambiguities in a narrative text, 
the resolutions are neither limitless nor arbitrary. Instead, the reader‘s interpretation is 
guided by the text itself, which actually prompts the reader on how to interpret the text.  
In other words, like signifyin(g), open texts actually educate the reader on how they are 
supposed to be red.  Iser posits the ―implied reader‖ as a textual construction based on 
how the text itself is asking to be read. Therefore, the ―implied reader‖ is a hypothetical, 
a model reader who ―embodies all those predispositions necessary for a literary work to 
exercise its effect -- predispositions laid down, not by an empirical outside reality, but by 
the text itself. Consequently, the implied reader as a concept has his roots firmly planted 
                                                          
7
 Iser references Umberto Eco for his distinction between open and closed texts. See Umberto Eco, The 
Role of the Reader. Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts. Bloomington, IL: Indiana UP, 1979. 3-10.  
8
 One of the strengths of Iser’s theory is that he does not deny the role of the author in constructing a 
text, but positions the author, the reader and the text itself as actors in the interpretive process. He 
delineates the relationship between the reader, the author, and the text in this way: a text is the artistic 
work of an author while a literary work is the aesthetic effect of the reader's engagement with the text. 
Reading is an act which results in the building up of a text into a literary work.  
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in the structure of the text; he is a construct and in no way to be identified with any real 
reader‖ (34).  
 As Esu‘s tale illustrates, and Iser‘s theory acknowledges, however, there is no 
model reader, who comes to the text as a blank state. Instead, actual readers come with 
convictions and beliefs that influence and, at times, distort their engagement with the 
textual structures. Iser describes the ―actual reader‖ as one who ―receives mental images 
while reading; but these images are, inevitably perhaps, modified by the experience and 
knowledge (and thus other images) which the reader brings to the text‖ (21). In this 
respect, readers often approach a piece of literature as a participant of the very system 
that the text is interrogating. Of course, scholars of African American culture and 
literature have long-recognized that this is the case and have deliberately positioned their 
own art and scholarship in order to counteract the cultural biases inherent in literary 
criticism. For example, Gates argues that it is imperative that we not only reassess literary 
texts themselves, but that we also analyze, ―the language of contemporary criticism itself, 
recognizing that hermeneutic systems are not universal, color-blind, apolitical or 
neutral…‖ (Loose Canons 27).  Again and again, contemporary scholars, all too aware of 
the political and cultural biases that mediate the evaluation of texts, have called not just 
for a reassessment of the canon but of the interpretive and aesthetic rubric of literary 
studies as well.  
 Considering these scholars‘ observations, readers‘ and critics‘ willingness to strip 
Bigger of his humanity should give us pause. Historically, race had been used not only to 
divide people from one another, but also to dehumanize certain races in the process. Of 
course, this dehumanization was often done through the very language of humanism, a 
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discourse which has historically functioned by eliding African Americans from 
consideration. If the idea of common humanity was seen as a justification for universal, 
egalitarian ethics, the idea of inhumanity was perpetually raised as a justification for 
hierarchical ethics, in particular for ethical hierarchies based on the notion of racial 
difference. Indeed, Gayatri Spivak identified the radical contradiction at the heart of the 
universal, emancipatory project of humanism when she pointed out that, ―slave holders 
and proponents of Christianizing the natives, and so on,‖ and those who have produced 
the discourse of universal humanity ironically coincide in the same historical subject. 
And it is precisely on the axis of humanism and subjectivity that the entire project of 
emancipation is most resilient, because, as she puts it, 
  The great doctrines of identity of the ethical universal, in terms of which  
  liberalism thought out its ethical programmes, played history false,  
  because the identity was disengaged in terms of who was and who was not 
  human. That‘s why all these projects, the justification of slavery, as well  
  as the justification of Christianization, seemed to be allright: because, after 
  all, these people had not graduated into humanhood, as it were (229). 
 
 In other words, accounts of universal humanity, and the ethical treatment that such 
humanity deserves, depended on and/or enabled the exclusion of certain people from the 
term, and thus from ethical treatment.   
 Even beyond emancipation, the question of universal humanity was striking in a 
twentieth-century America that claimed to offer equal rights to all people but insisted on 
legally dividing its citizens into races and denying particular people legal protection in 
the process. As Morrison puts it, ―Living in a nation of people who decided that their 
world view would combine agendas for individual freedom and mechanisms for 
devastating racial oppression presents a singular landscape for a writer‖ (xiii). 
Maintaining this contradictory world view required denying the ―overwhelmingly 
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undeniable‖ – the humanity of black people. Making black people full citizens and 
granting them equal rights meant nothing less than widening their concept of humanity. 
Of course, as Richard Yarbrough points out, this is why black artists were preoccupied 
with convincing  white  audiences that blacks  ―were  not  only  human but  fully  
endowed  with the  traits and abilities  necessary  for  them  to  meet  or  surpass  the  
standards  used  to  adjudge  acceptability into  the  white,  bourgeois  American  
mainstream‖ (111). Positioning their writing at the center of America‘s dynamic 
humanist discourse, many African American authors viewed literature as a way 
accessing, representing and fostering universal humanity. Recently, this has become 
known as ―the cultural turn‖ in African American politics—an attempt to overturn racism 
not by ―direct political action‖ but by ―indirect cultural politics‖ (Warren 25-41). Explicit 
in the ―cultural turn‖ was the idea that art and literature were equipped to demonstrate the 
hypocrisies of racial segregation, and thus to dismantle Jim Crow.  
 However, Wright accused these writers of ―begging the question of Negroes‘ 
humanity‖ (123). Generally speaking, he argues, ―Negro writing in the past has been 
confined to humble novels, poems, and plays, decorous ambassadors who go a-begging 
to white America. They entered the Court of American Public Opinion dressed in the 
knee-pants of servility, curtsying to show that the Negro was not inferior, that he was 
human, and that he had a life comparable to that of other people‖ (97). These writers, 
according to Wright, had limited to fighting their battles on the white audience‘s terms – 
by struggling to prove that black people were fully human, African American writers 
inadvertently accepted the premise that black humanity needed to be earned, that it was 
contingent at all. In other words, Wright refused to ―beg the question of Negroes‘ 
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humanity,‖ not because he rejected African American writers‘ investment in humanity, 
but because he believed they had failed to do their investment justice. For Wright, the 
question of black humanity was not the issue, instead, he was interested in documenting 
and interrogating the systems which lent credence to such arguments in the first place. 
Hence his interest in communism, naturalism, and the Chicago school of sociology, 
which he viewed as tools for analyzing the material conditions under which the 
dehumanization of black people was maintained.  
 Baldwin and Ellison, among others, faulted Wright for such a project because 
they believed that in his effort to represent inhuman conditions, Wright had represented 
his characters as less than human, inadvertently reinforcing prevailing stereotypes about 
black inhumanity. Wright‘s methodology amounted to a ―pathologizing of blackness,‖ 
they charged, and limited him to representing black people as dehumanized abstractions. 
But as Wright‘s writings make clear, his relationship to naturalism, sociology, and even 
communism were complicated at best. Wright certainly viewed those philosophies as 
useful starting points, but it seems unlikely, based on his own comments, that he believed 
that the fullness of black life, or the complexity of the race problem, could be accounted 
for by any single discipline or mode of representation. Wright says as much, not only in 
―Blueprint for Negro Literature,‖ but also in the explanatory essays that he attached to 
some of his most widely read works. For example, in the preface to Black Boy Wright 
explains ―The Communists, I felt, had oversimplified the experience of those whom they 
sought to lead…they had missed the meaning of the lives of the masses, had conceived of 
people in too abstract a manner. I would make voyages, discoveries, explorations with 
words and try to put some of that meaning back‖ (320). For Wright, ―putting some of that 
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meaning back,‖ was to account for the individual human life that underlies each 
abstraction.   
 Of course this is precisely how Wright describes his protagonist in Native Son: 
what makes Bigger‘s character so complex, Wright argues: he ―was hovering unwanted 
between two worlds - between powerful America and his own stunted place in life‖ 
(451). In other words, Bigger is both a symbolic figure of American life and a discrete 
person. It was this ―dual aspect‖ of Bigger‘s consciousness that Wright labored to present 
in his novel (451).. He explains that in constructing Bigger‘s character his task was 
twofold: ―First, there was his personal and private life…that elusive core of being, that 
individual data of consciousness which in every man and woman is like that in no 
other… Then I was confronted with that part of him that was dual in aspect, dim, 
wavering, that part of him which is so much a part of all Negroes and all whites‖ (450).  
Wright sums up Bigger‘s character, asserting, ―Bigger, as I saw and felt him, was a snarl 
of many realities; he had in him many levels of life‖ (450). Wright describes his project 
in the novel as nothing short of a humanist endeavor. Of his decision to construct Bigger 
he explains, ―I felt that a right more immediately deeper than that of politics or race was 
at stake; that is, a human right, the right of a man to think and feel honestly. And 
especially did this personal and human right bear hard upon me, for temperamentally I 
am inclined to satisfy the claims of my own ideals rather than the expectations of others‖ 
(449). In other words, the very character that so many readers view as subhuman was 
actually written as an assertion of unqualified and universal humanity.         
 If Bigger‘s humanity in the novel seems more threatened than it should, perhaps 
this is because Wright portrays him as an individual who is continually being stripped of 
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his personhood and mortified into the crudest of symbols; his story is one of a discrete 
individual warring to free himself from the symbolic figure others believe him to be. 
Bigger is never seen by any of the characters in the novel as an individual, rather he is 
perceived by the Daltons, Jan, Britten, and Buckley as the member of a group that they 
already know everything about. Even Bigger‘s attorney Max, understands him as a social 
symbol, but imperfectly as a human being. Though Max is the sometime hero of the 
novel, his heroic status is ambiguous — ultimately Bigger rejects Max‘s determinist 
reading of the case and Max, unable to recognize Bigger as an individual stumbles 
blindly from the jail cell. Wright seems to point to the way in which pure environmental 
determinism fails to address the individual need to feel human. Likewise, Bigger does not 
see white people as individuals, rather, ―to Bigger and his kind white people were not 
really people; they were a sort of great natural force, like a stormy sky looming 
overhead,‖ and his scenes with them are marked by obscuring images of snowfall, the 
white vapor of his breath, and the ghostlike white blur of Mrs. Dalton (114).  
 Furthermore, the two pivotal scenes of violence in the novel are precipitated by 
encounters in which characters are symbolically stripped of their individuality. For 
example, Bigger accidentally suffocates and then dismembers Mary because he believes 
that the only possible interpretation of his being in her room is rape. As Gallagher notes, 
―Over 300 years of conditioning tell Bigger the implications of his being found in the 
unconscious Mary‘s bedroom, and he acts in response to a racial prototype rather than to 
the specifics of the situation‖ (6). In other words, the violence that Bigger commits 
against Mary occurs because he knows that he will be misread as a stereotype. Wright 
dramatizes the violence of this symbolic encounter in very literal terms. As Mrs. Dalton 
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appears in the doorway Bigger‘s body ―stiffens‖ in fear, causing him to accidentally 
suffocate Mary – in other words, he quite literally stiffens into a symbol. As Jonathan 
Elmer observes, ―what Wright ruthlessly delivers here is the image of Bigger becoming 
the fantasmatic phallus of the white supremacist fantasy. The various associations 
clustering in Bigger's name now come into full force. Bigger becomes bigger than 
himself at this moment, an aggrandizement that is also, excruciatingly, the definitive 
reduction to stereotype‖ (780). Mary too, is victimized symbolically: her body is emptied 
of actual meaning and she registers only as the symbol of white womanhood that 
subtends the fantasy of the black man as rapist and murderer. Wright shows that in 
turning Bigger and Mary into symbols – Bigger as the stereotype of the black rapist and 
Mary as the symbol of white feminine purity – both are dehumanized.  
 If the white characters in the novel fail to recognize Bigger‘s humanity, he 
perpetuates this symbolic dehumanization against his girlfriend Bessie. Bigger never 
recognizes that his sexual interaction with her might be rape because he never really 
recognizes Bessie as a human being. Instead, while they are having sex, Bigger perceives 
her, ―as a fallow field beneath him stretching out under a cloudy sky waiting for rain,‖ as 
a ―warm night see,‖ a ―fountain whose warm waters washed and cleaned his senses‖ 
(135). In their sexual interactions Bigger alone maintains his subjectivity while Bessie is 
stripped of personhood and reduced to a series of metaphors that grant him unlimited 
access to her body. Just moments before Bigger victimizes Bessie, he describes the act of 
rape in highly symbolic terms, reasoning, ―rape was not what one did to women. Rape 
was what one felt when one‘s back was against a wall and one had to strike out‖ (228). 
This metaphorical substitution is literalizes in the brutal rape and murder of Bessie.  
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 In these scenes Wright depicts the kind of tension his representation of Bigger 
creates between his readers and his book. Readers who overlook the artistic and aesthetic 
sophistication of Wright‘s novel are inadvertently forced into the position of mirroring 
the characters – the readers, like the characters within the novel, cease to regard Bigger as 
an individual. Reading Bigger as a symbol by divesting him of his individuality is a 
replication of the violence that is perpetuated throughout the novel. Furthermore, the 
judgment that Bigger is subhuman also duplicates the inability of characters within the 
novel to recognize Bigger‘s humanity. Wright manipulates a racist stereotype in his novel 
to confront readers with the inadequacy of their own culturally conditioned gaze.   
 Unfortunately, a review of scholarship and criticism written about Wright‘s novel 
over the fifty years since its publication suggests that, despite his most vigorous efforts, 
readers persist in ―begging the question of Negroes‘ humanity.‖ A brief survey of the 
most recent articles written about the novel reveals that, as my classmates had done, 
readers persist, in stripping Bigger of his personhood.   In doing so, readers are 
participating (though perhaps unconsciously) in a cultural system which has naturalized 
the calculation of black humanity. A sophisticated metaphorical substitution of Bigger‘s 
humanity is ultimately just another instrumentalization of black humanity. One might 
counter that Bigger, as a character in a novel, is merely a linguistic construction and not 
really a person anyway, or what EM Forster referred to as ―a construction within a 
construction.‖ For example, Georges Poulet and J. Hillis Miller have recently argued that 
because a novels are a textual medium, nobody can be said to exist outside of the words 
written down by the verbal mind of the novel‘s narrator. While this is certainly true, one 
of the crucial mimetic conventions of reading narrative is that literature can and does 
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refer to a ―reality‖ beyond the confines of the book. This is especially the case with 
realist or naturalist inflected texts which share the assumption that narrative can 
accomplish work in the ―real world.‖ In a study on mimesis and representation, Kendall 
Walton argues that readers display an almost existential need to treat the contents of a 
fictional narrative as constitutive of a reality that, at least for the duration of reading the 
narrative, is almost as real as any non-fictional world. In other words, a reader‘s credulity 
can make any story of any human figure seem real, at least for the duration of the reading 
experience. 
 Purely symbolic readings Wright‘s novel perpetuate the fungibility of black 
humanity. Symbolically removing Bigger from human consideration is to relegate him to 
a moral and psychological no-man‘s land. For example, in the May 1940 issue of ―New 
International,‖ CLR James published a review of Native Son in which he forwards a 
purely allegorical reading of the novel. Declaring that, ―Bigger Thomas is a symbol and 
prototype of the Negro masses in the proletarian revolution,‖ James describes Bigger‘s 
accidental murder of Mary as a ―striking blow…against his hated enemies,‖ and Bigger‘s 
grisly murder of the innocent Bessie is deemed ―subordinate to his great purpose, to fight 
against these tyrants and torturers‖ (92-93) In James‘s allegorical reading of the novel, 
Bigger‘s horrific violence is subsumed to the symbolic import of his struggle, rendering 
the gruesome deaths of two innocent women mere collateral damage. Such a reading 
allows for unconscionable substitutions and metaphorizations, scrambles agents and 
victims, and generally destroys the most basic ethical landmarks.  
 To engage with a work‘s humanistic meanings may actually require some 
empathy with the moral, ethical, or political themes to be admitted as evident in the work 
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under critical examination. Of course, perceiving a character as a real human being is at 
least partly determined by readers‘ conventions for determining what counts as a human 
being in the first place, whether the features of the character are perceived as resembling 
those of a human being. Responding to a racially insensitive review of the novel, Wright 
declared: ―If there had been one person in the Dalton household who viewed Bigger 
Thomas as a human being, the crime would have been solved in half an hour. Did not 
Bigger himself know that it was the denial of his personality that enabled him to escape 
detection so long? The one piece of incriminating evidence which would have solved the 
‗murder mystery‘ was Bigger's humanity, and the  Daltons, Britten, and the  newspaper 
men could not see or admit the living clue of Bigger's humanity under their very eyes!‖ 
(Bite 828). To disregard Bigger‘s humanity is to overlook the central message of 
Wright‘s project: the imperative of recognizing others‘ humanity and individuality in a 
system that universalizes and dehumanizes.    
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